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RESIDENCY AND EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
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INTRODUCTION
If there is “a race to the bottom to see who can most thoroughly
ostracize and condemn” sex offenders among states and
municipalities, Georgia is a front runner.1 Georgia’s laws for
convicted sex offenders are among the toughest in the United States,2
including a sex offender registry and residency and employment
restrictions.3 Once a person has been convicted of certain sexual
crimes,4 as well as of certain crimes against minors, regardless of
*
J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Jonathan Todres
for his valuable feedback and advice, and thanks to my family—Clint, Robin, and Eli—for their
unending patience and support.
1. Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State of
Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 514 (2007).
2. Id. at 515 (quoting Georgia State Representative Jerry Keen discussing residency and
employment restrictions for registered sex offenders); Amanda West, The Georgia Legislature Strikes
with a Vengeance! Sex Offender Residency Restrictions & the Deterioration of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 239, 239–41 (2007); Id. at 239 n.4 (comparing Georgia statutes with
statutes from twenty-two other states also imposing restrictions on convicted sex offenders).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register if they are convicted of committing the
following sexual crimes on or after July 30, 2001, against a victim who is a minor: criminal sexual
conduct toward a minor, solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct, use of a minor in a sexual
performance, solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, or any conviction resulting from a sexual
offense against a minor victim. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010). A victim is defined as a
“minor” if she or he is under age eighteen at the time of the offense. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14)
(2010). Offenders must also register if they are convicted of any dangerous sexual offense, regardless of
the age of the victim. Dangerous sexual offenses include: rape, aggravated assault with the intent to
commit rape, sodomy, aggravated sodomy, statutory rape if the convicted individual is at least twentyone years of age, child molestation, aggravated child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes,
sexual assault against a person in custody, incest, second conviction of sexual battery, aggravated sexual
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whether the criminal activities were of a sexual nature,5 he is required
to register and comply with residency and employment restrictions.6
In Georgia, minors who are convicted of sex offenses must comply
with the same registry and residency requirements as adult sex
offenders.7 This is not limited to violent crimes or acts that are
predatory in nature.8 The result: Georgia teenagers can be convicted
battery, sexual exploitation of children, electronically furnishing obscene material to minors, computer
pornography and child exploitation, obscene telephone contact, any sexual offense or attempted sexual
offense against a victim who is a minor. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register as a sexual offender if they are convicted
of committing the following crimes on or after July 30, 2001, even if the crimes were not sexual in
nature: kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-112(a)(9)(B) (2010). A victim is a “minor” if she or he is under the age of eighteen at the time of the
offense. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Kidnapping or false imprisonment involving a victim
who is less than fourteen years old, except by a parent, is considered a “dangerous sexual offense” and
convicted offenders must register as sexual offenders, even if the offensive conduct is not sexual. GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010). See also Bill Rankin, Ga. Supreme Court Rebuffs Sex Offender
Registry Challenge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta/ga-supremecourt-rebuffs-371444.html (discussing an example of an offender required to register as a sex offender
when the underlying crime, kidnapping, was not sexual in nature).
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). Any individual required to register under GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12 (2010) may not reside within one thousand feet of any childcare facility, church, school, or
area where minors congregate. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010). The restrictions on employment are
slightly less strict: no individual required to register as a sexual offender may volunteer or be employed
at any entity within one thousand feet of a childcare center, school, or church, but the employment
restrictions do not extend to entities near “areas where minors congregate.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-115(c) (2010). “Areas where minors congregate” are defined by statute as including: all public and
private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums,
school bus stops, public libraries, and public community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-112(a)(3) (2010). A registered sex offender who knowingly violates the residency and employment
restrictions “shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor
more than 30 years.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010).
7. Juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not required to register, nor are those convicted of
misdemeanors. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(C) (2010). In Georgia, the legal age of majority is
eighteen, and all persons under eighteen are minors. GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1(a) (2010). However,
seventeen-year-old minors who commit offenses are tried as adults in Georgia; they are not under the
jurisdiction of state juvenile courts. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(2)(A) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1128 (2010). Furthermore, any minor between ages thirteen and seventeen who is charged with a crime
can be tried in superior court and convicted of a felony. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(1) (2010).
Minors who commit any of seven crimes are automatically tried as adults and in superior court: murder,
voluntary manslaughter, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual
battery, or armed robbery with a firearm. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(b)(2)(A) (2010).
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Examples of offenses that trigger the registration requirement, but
may be non-violent or may occur in the context of a peer-on-peer relationship when perpetrated by a
juvenile offender include: electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor, solicitation of a minor
to engage in sexual conduct, and the catchall “[a]ny conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense”
against a minor victim. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B)
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of sex offenses and required to register as sex offenders and comply
with strict residency and employment requirements for behavior that
may be quite different from the predatory offenses usually brought to
mind by the term “sex offender.”9
For example, a high school sophomore in Georgia was arrested in
spring 2010 for furnishing obscene material to a minor.10 If charged
under Georgia’s child pornography laws and convicted, this
seventeen-year-old boy would be required to register as a sex
offender who committed a “dangerous sexual offense” and prohibited
from residing or loitering near any area where minors congregate—
including his own high school.11 What behavior warrants these severe
consequences? He sent a naked picture of himself to a sixteen-yearold friend via text message, also known as “sexting.”12 Does the
punishment fit the crime?
This Note explores whether, when applied to minors, Georgia laws
requiring registration as a sex offender and restricting residency and
employment based on registration violate the Eighth Amendment
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.13 Part I discusses
Georgia’s current requirements for sex offenders, including
registration, residency, and employment restrictions.14 Part II
considers the constitutional validity of these restrictions as applied to
(2010). Some peer-on-peer conduct satisfies the elements of sexual crimes, even though it may be nonviolent or consensual. See, e.g., Wendy S. Cash, A Search for “Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation” in
Wilson v. State, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 225, 226–28 (discussing the case of Genarlow Wilson, a
seventeen-year-old boy charged and convicted of felony aggravated child molestation for having
received consensual oral sex from a fifteen-year-old girl in 2003, conduct that would be a misdemeanor
under current Georgia law).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
10. Jeffry Scott, Atlanta Schools, Parents, and Law Try to Deal with Sexting, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-schools-parents-and-482243.html (reporting two
incidents of “sexting” in metro Atlanta schools resulting in different consequences for the teenaged
offenders, including this incident in which a seventeen-year-old boy was arrested and charged with
furnishing obscene material to a minor after sending a naked picture of himself via cell phone text
message to a sixteen-year-old girl, who forwarded the picture to four other students).
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(e)(2) (2010); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010).
12. Scott, supra note 10.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-115 (2010).
14. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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juvenile sex offenders in light of two considerations: Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence on proportionality of punishments, and
recent scientific research on brain development in adolescents.15 In so
doing, Part II applies the proportionality analysis from the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Graham v. Florida16 to the
Georgia sex offender statutes and evaluates how recent scientific
developments inform analysis of Georgia laws.17 Finally, Part III
proposes changes that address the constitutional concerns raised by
the restrictions on juvenile sex offenders in Georgia, while also
serving the public interest in protecting children from sex offenders.18
I. GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES
A. Georgia Sex Offender Registry And Residency And Employment
Restrictions And Their Application To Sex Offenders Who Are
Minors
Georgia law provides that any individual convicted of certain
sexual crimes register by providing his name, address, employer,
fingerprints, and other information to the sheriff of his county of
residence.19 The sheriff’s office of each Georgia county maintains
15. See discussion infra Part II. See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Jessica E. Brown, Classifying Juveniles “Among the Worst Offenders”:
Utilizing Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adolescent
Sex Offenders, 39 STETSON L. REV. 369 (2010); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd,
Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Lawrence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003).
16. 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23. The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Graham v. Florida
delineates a model for reviewing whether a sentence is categorically “cruel and unusual” based on
proportionality. Id. In Graham, the Court’s analysis weighs the culpability of the actor and suggests that
scientific developments in psychology and neurology inform our understanding of the culpability of
juvenile offenders. Id. at 2026.
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(16) (2010). “Required registration information” that the offender
must provide includes: name; social security number; age; race; sex; date of birth; fingerprints;
photograph; physical description; address; identifying information if the offender’s residence is a trailer,
vessel, mobile home or otherwise moveable; employment information; vehicle description and license
number; and crimes for which she was convicted. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text for
crimes that trigger the registration requirement. For an offender being released from prison, the
information is gathered prior to his release, but after release the offender must update the information on
the registry within seventy-two hours of moving to a new residence. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(b)
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this information, and it must be publicly available at county offices
and on the internet.20 Thus, in addition to facilitating the state in
keeping tabs on sex offenders, the registry creates a means by which
“[w]ith the click of a mouse, [anyone] can now download the name,
photograph, and address of every sex offender in our communities.”21
While “‘sex offender’ is synonymous with a pedophile or rapist to
most lay audiences” that is not the case for all offenders required to
register under Georgia’s statutes, for several reasons.22 First,
offenders convicted of certain crimes against minors are classified as
sex offenders, even though their criminal activities were not sexual in
nature.23 Second, minors can be required to register for offenses
involving victims who are their peers or even activities where all
parties consented, such as the sexting example above.24 Third, since
the registry requirement and residency and employment restrictions
apply uniformly to all offenders,25 regardless of the underlying
(2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(f) (2010).
20. The sex offender registry list must be available to the public on the sheriff’s website and in the
sheriff’s office, any county administrative building, the administrative building of any municipal
corporation, and the office of the clerk of the superior court. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(i)(3) (2010).
21. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 514.
22. Id. at 517.
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(14) (2010). Offenders must register as a sexual offender if they are convicted
of kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor on or after July 30, 2001, even if the crime involved no
sexual conduct, except when committed by a parent. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010). See
also Rankin, supra note 5 (discussing an example of a Georgia man required to register as a sex
offender when the underlying crime was not sexual in nature).
24. Scott, supra note 10 (providing one example of a teen arrested for text messaging a naked image
to a peer). Some teen-on-teen behaviors that once gave rise to felony convictions even though the
“victim” consented, such as statutory rape or consensual oral sex, are now addressed through “Romeo
and Juliet” exceptions. In Georgia, when the victim is between the ages of fourteen and sixteen (for
statutory rape and child molestation) or between the ages of thirteen and sixteen (for sodomy, including
oral and anal sex), and the offender is eighteen years old or younger and no more than four years older
than the victim, the offense is only a misdemeanor. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2006), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf (tracking the 2006
amendments to sex offense statutes incorporating these “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions). See
Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821, 822–23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (vacating the requirement that a man
register as a sex offender despite having pled guilty to sexual battery because the consensual sexual
incident would be treated as a misdemeanor offense under the 2006 amendments to the sex offender
registry statute). However, other offenses for which conviction would result in registration as a sex
offender do not have “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions for offenders who perpetrate the behavior with or
against a peer.
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010) (defining a “sexual offender” as any individual
“convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual offense,”
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criminal behavior, all offenders categorized as sex offenders are
“treated . . . like the worst offender.”26 Legislators advocating these
strict limitations for sex offenders, even after offenders have served
their prison sentence and probation, proclaim their intent to prevent
criminals from “prey[ing] on innocent children.”27 Courts hearing
challenges to sex offender registry and residency restrictions have
affirmed this intent to “protect children from known sex offenders.”28
Yet, juvenile offenders, who may be unlikely to pose any further
threat to children, are treated the same as all other sex offenders.29
The 2006 amendments to the residency and employment
restrictions for sex offenders30 made Georgia’s sex offender laws the
“toughest . . . in the country.”31 The residency restrictions prevent
individuals from living within one thousand feet of any childcare
facility, church, school, or area where minors congregate.32 The
employment restrictions are slightly less extensive, forbidding sex
offenders from working or volunteering at a school, church, or
childcare facility or any entity within one thousand feet of such
although those offenses, as defined by GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) and GA. CODE ANN. § 42-112(a)(10)(B), encompass a wide range of conduct (emphasis added)).
26. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518.
27. Id. at 516 (quoting Georgia State Representative Jerry Keen, a sponsor of the 2006 bill making
the residency and employment restrictions stricter in Georgia (citing Ga. H.R. 1059)).
28. West, supra note 2, at 247 & n.39 (citing multiple federal and state court decisions
acknowledging the intent of residency restrictions to protect public safety, particularly the safety of
children).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010). As of March 31, 2011, Georgia’s sex offender registry
includes 19,620 registered sex offenders, including twenty-one children aged seventeen or younger. GA.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, GEORGIA’S REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.georgia.gov/00/channel_modifieddate/0,2096,67862954_87983024,00.html. For profiling
purposes, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation includes eighteen-year-old offenders with the youngest
set of adult offenders. Id. There are currently 1,378 sex offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five residing
in Georgia. Id.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(20) (2010); 1996 Ga. Laws 1520 (establishing the original sex
offender registry in Georgia); Geraghty, supra note 1, at 515–18.
31. West, supra note 2, at 239 (quoting the sponsor of the 2006 bill, Rep. Jerry Keen of Georgia
House District 179); see also BRENDA V. SMITH, FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, NIC/ WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE (2009) (reporting
sex offender registration, residency and employment statutes and their application to juveniles for every
state and the District of Columbia); discussion infra Part III.C.1.
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010). Any individual required to register under title 42, chapter 1,
section 12 of the Georgia Code may not reside within one thousand feet of any childcare facility,
church, school, or area where minors congregate. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010). See also Ga.
H.R. 1059 (tracking the 2006 amendments to sex offense statutes).
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places.33 The consequences for failing to comply with these
restrictions are severe: once a sex offender is aware that she resides
within one thousand feet of a forbidden entity, she must move
immediately or face a prison sentence between ten and thirty years.34
Further, the definition of areas where minors congregate35 is so broad
it excludes sex offenders from most residential areas of the state.36
Residency restrictions like these make it so difficult for sex offenders
to find a place to live in the state that the “laws act as the ‘effective
equivalent of banishment.’”37
B. Legal Challenges To Georgia Sex Offender Statutes
Georgia’s sex offender registry and residency and employment
restrictions have faced several legal challenges.38 As passed in 2006,
the residency restrictions did not include any exceptions for sex
offenders who owned their homes prior to the implementation of the
restrictions, or who owned their homes before a school, daycare or
other area where minors congregate came to them.39 A sex offender
ordered to vacate his home and business when childcare centers
opened near both places challenged the law as an unconstitutional
33. No individual required to register as a sexual offender may volunteer or be employed at any
entity within one thousand feet of a childcare center, school, or church, but the employment restrictions
do not extend to entities near “areas where minors congregate.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (b)–(c)
(2010).
34. A registered sex offender who knowingly violates the residency and employment restrictions
“shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30
years.” GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010).
35. “Areas where minors congregate” are defined by statute as including all public and private parks
and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus
stops, public libraries, and public community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2010).
36. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
and for a Permanent Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of the “School Bus Stop” Provision of O.C.G.A.
§ 42-1-15(B), 42-1-16(B) at 13–15, 19–20, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. Sept.
15, 2006), available at http://www.schr.org/files/post/FACTS.pdf (noting that if the residency restriction
were enforced as written, “[i]n many cases, all or nearly all persons on the registry . . . will have to
move.”) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Statement]; Geraghty, supra note 1, at 520.
37. West, supra note 2, at 248 (quoting Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005)).
38. See generally Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010); Mann v. Ga. Dept. of Corr., 653
S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007); Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006).
39. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf; see generally Debra Hunter & Paul
Sharman, Note, Crimes and Offenses: Sexual Offenses, 23 GA. ST. L. REV. 11 (2006).
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taking of his property.40 The Georgia Supreme Court found that the
lack of a “grandfather clause” in the residency restrictions was
improper.41 The court noted that without such protection for
homeowners, “there is no place in Georgia where a registered sex
offender can live without being continually at risk of being
ejected.”42
The restrictions were then amended to exempt homeowners who
owned property prior to an entity where minors congregate
establishing a location within the proscribed distance, thus
grandfathering in pre-existing property owners.43 Subsequent
amendment also exempted leaseholders whose lease agreements
predate the establishment of a child-centered establishment within the
forbidden distance, but only during “the duration of the executed
lease.”44 Once the lease ends, the sex offender must move to a home
in compliance with the restrictions.45
Another challenge to the Georgia statutes was brought by a man
required to register as a sex offender even though he was convicted
for a non-sexual crime: false imprisonment.46 He challenged the
constitutionality of the statute, claiming it was cruel and unusual
40. Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 742.
41. Id. at 745–46 (finding the residency restrictions constituted a taking when the plaintiff owned his
home prior to the relocation of a childcare center nearby that violated the one-thousand-foot residency
restriction, but finding no improper taking of his business because the statute does not prevent a sex
offender from owning a business proximate to a childcare center, merely from working in such a
business).
42. Id. at 742.
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); S. 1, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/pdf/sb1.pdf
(amending residency restrictions in 2008 to provide that homeowners who are registered sex offenders
do not violate state residency restrictions when a school, childcare center, or other area where minors
congregate locates within one thousand feet of their residences).
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); H.R. 571, § 13,
150th
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ga.
2010),
available
at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb571.pdf (amending the residency restrictions in 2010 to
allow leaseholders who are registered sex offenders residing on property leased prior to the location of a
school, childcare center, or other area where minors congregate within one thousand feet to remain in
their residence until the executed lease expires). The amendments also allow offenders with established
employment to retain their employment if a childcare center, church, or school is later established within
one thousand feet of their places of employment.
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(e) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(f)(3) (2010); Plaintiffs’
Statement, supra note 36, at 12–13.
46. Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. 2010).
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punishment when the offense was not sexual in nature.47 The Georgia
Supreme Court held that the law was constitutional, even applied to
non-sexual offenses, because it has a rational relationship to the
intent of the sex offender registration statute,48 even though the
dissenting opinion pointed out that most instances of kidnapping and
false imprisonment do not involve any sexual assault.49
A pending suit in the U.S. District Court in the Northern Division
of Georgia challenges the “school bus stop provision” of the
residency restrictions.50 The 2006 amendment expanding the
definition of “areas where minors congregate” to include school bus
stops would ban registered offenders from living or working within
one thousand feet of designated school bus stops,51 but has not yet
been enforced in the state.52 Georgia registered sex offenders who
would be forced to move or face imprisonment if the school bus stop
provision were enforced have filed a class-action lawsuit against the
state.53 As school bus stops are pervasive in residential areas and
change frequently based on school enrollment, plaintiffs assert that
the school bus stop provision violates due process because it is
unconstitutionally vague.54 Because attempts to repeal the school bus
47. Id. at 828–29.
48. Id. at 828–29 (finding that the registration statute was not over-inclusive in applying to offenders
convicted of non-sexual crimes because the statute has a satisfactory rational relationship to the “State’s
legitimate goal of informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm
them;” and finding that the registry requirement was not cruel and unusual punishment because it is a
regulatory requirement, not a punishment).
49. Id. at 830–31 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the registration statute is over-inclusive
in including those whose offenses are not sexual in nature and “is clearly not rational” in treating all
kidnappings and false imprisonments as sexual offenses, when research indicates less than half of such
crimes involve sexual assault).
50. Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006).
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12(a)(9)(B) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10)(B) (2010).
52. Plaintiffs’ Statement, supra note 36, at 6, 9.
53. Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006).
54. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and for a Permanent
Injunction to Enjoin Enforcement of the “School Bus Stop” Provision of O.C.G.A. § 42-1-15(B) and
O.C.G.A. § 42-1-16(B), Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.schr.org/files/post/BUS%20STOP%20BRIEF%209%2015%2010.pdf (asserting
that the school bus stop provision is unconstitutionally vague and violates substantive due process
rights). In response to plaintiff’s motions in this case, the court has granted a temporary restraining order
preventing the enforcement of the school bus stop provision of § 42-1-15(b), Whitaker v. Perdue, No.
4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006) (order granting temporary restraining order), as well as a
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stop provision have been unsuccessful thus far, offenders seeking
relief from this provision await the outcome of this suit.55
C. Duration Of Georgia Sex Offender Registration Requirements
Georgia statute requires sex offenders, including juvenile sex
offenders, to register “for the entire life of the sexual offender.”56 The
residency and employment restrictions apply to anyone required to
register, so they also continue for the sex offender’s “entire life.”57
Provided certain statutory criteria are met, the offender can petition
to be released from the default lifetime registration requirements ten
years after completing all prison, parole, and probation for the
offense.58 The superior court then has the discretion to release the
offender from the registration requirements or residency or
employment restrictions—completely or in part, permanently or for a
specific time period—based on the court’s assessment of whether the
person poses a risk of perpetrating another sexual offense.59
However, the possibility remains that a minor convicted as a sex
temporary injunction prohibiting enforcement of § 42-1-15 “to the extent that it restricts registered sex
offenders from engaging in volunteer activities at churches,” Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-CV-0140CC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009) (order granting preliminary injunction). Accordingly, the bus stop
provision of the residency restrictions is currently unenforced due to the temporary order, although it
remains in the statute.
55. Geraghty, supra note 1, at 529.
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(f)(6) (2010).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a)(1) (2010) (invoking the registration requirement of GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-12(f)(6)).
58. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19 (2010). The offender must remain on the registry for ten years after
completing all prison, parole, and probation for the offense before petitioning for release from the
registration requirements. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(c)(2) (2010). However, the offender may apply
immediately upon completing all prison, parole and probation for the offense if he is: confined to a
nursing home or hospice facility, totally and permanently disabled, or otherwise seriously physically
disabled. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(a)(1) (2010). An offender may also petition for release from the
registry if he was convicted for a felony that has since become punishable as a misdemeanor or was
convicted of kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor and the offense was not sexual in nature. GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(a)(2)–(3) (2010). See Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)
(vacating the registration requirement because the sexual offense was consensual oral sex with a
fourteen-year-old when the offender was eighteen years old, which would be treated as a misdemeanor
offense after the 2006 amendments to the sex offender registry statute).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(f) (2010). This was clarified by a 2010 amendment; prior to this
amendment the offender could petition to be removed from the registry, but could not appeal the
residency and employment restrictions. H.R. 571, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010), available
at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/pdf/hb571.pdf.
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offender in Georgia will spend the rest of his life on the sex offender
registry and must comply with the residency and employment
restrictions for the duration of the registration requirement or risk a
minimum prison sentence of ten years.60 For juvenile offenders, this
may be a cruel and unusual punishment.
II. APPLYING GRAHAM V. FLORIDA’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW TO GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES
A. Graham v. Florida: Evaluating Whether A Law Is “Cruel And
Unusual” Based On Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida provides a
model for reviewing whether a sentence is categorically “cruel and
unusual” and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment.61 In
Graham, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a sentence of
life in prison without chance of parole for juvenile offenders who
committed non-homicide crimes.62 When considering whether a
punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the United States
Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he concept of proportionality is
central.”63 While some Eighth Amendment cases involve challenges
to a sentence in a particular case, in Graham the Court considered
categorical sentencing rules, evaluating the constitutionality of a life
sentence without parole for any juvenile non-homicide offender.64 To
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(g) (2010).
61. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022, 2027–31 (2010); State v. Gomez, 235 P.3d 1203
(Kan. 2010) (discussing how the analytical framework of Graham could be applied to a categorical
challenge of disproportionality to a sentence of life in prison with a mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty-five years for a conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of
fourteen).
62. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–19. Graham, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crime, was
charged as an adult for burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery after attempting to
rob a restaurant and hitting and injuring its manager. Id. at 2018. Graham pled guilty, and the trial court
withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to probation. Id. Graham violated his probation within
six months by participating in a home invasion robbery and possessing a firearm. Id. at 2018–19. The
trial court then found Graham guilty of the earlier armed robbery and sentenced him to life in prison. Id.
at 2020. In Florida, there is no parole system, so his sentence was for life in prison without parole. Id.
Graham challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
63. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
64. Id. at 2021–22.
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consider whether the challenged sentence is constitutionally “cruel
and unusual punishment” the Court evaluated proportionality,
considering 1) whether there is a balance between the culpability of
the offender and the severity of the punishment and 2) whether the
sentence serves legitimate penological goals.65 The Court found that
a sentence of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders
is unconstitutional, based in part on considerations that juvenile
offenders are less culpable than adults who commit the same acts.66
The life sentence challenged in Graham is clearly different from
the Georgia sex offender registry and residency and employment
requirements.67 However, the Graham Court set forth a model for
conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis of the proportionality of a
categorical sentencing rule while considering “developments in
psychology and brain science [that] show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds.”68 This model of proportionality
review can be applied to Georgia’s sex offender registration and
residency and employment restrictions to evaluate whether, taken
together, they constitute cruel and unusual punishment when applied
to juvenile offenders.69
65. Id. at 2026.
66. Id. at 2026–27, 2034.
67. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 421-19 (2010); Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.
68. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
69. The United State Supreme Court has found that requiring sex offenders to register with the state
is not a punishment, which would preclude court challenges to sex offender registries under the Eighth
Amendment. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003). The Georgia Supreme Court has also found
that “current law does not deem registration as a sexual offender to be punishment.” Hollie v. State, 696
S.E.2d 642, 643 (Ga. 2010). Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court asserts “sexual offender registry
requirements such as those contained in OCGA § 42-1-12 are regulatory, and not punitive, in nature.”
Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. 2010). Defining the registry requirements as regulatory rather
than punitive has allowed states, including Georgia, to defend registration statutes against claims that
they impose ex post facto punishments or sentences exceeding maximum statutory punishment. See
Smith, 538 U.S. 84; Hollie, 696 S.E.2d at 643; Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 828.
While registration requirements alone may be deemed regulatory, when considered with accompanying
residency and employment restrictions Georgia’s requirements seem far more punitive. This Note
applies Eighth Amendment analysis to the registration requirements of § 42-1-12 in tandem with the
residency and employment restrictions of § 42-1-15. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-15 (2010). “Registration [and residency restrictions] limit[] where the offender can live, work,
and congregate,” and they are “no mere administrative formality or minor inconvenience.” Rainer, 690
S.E.2d at 831 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting).
The Georgia Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Taylor v. State, indicates the unique position of
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1. Applying Proportionality Review to a Non-Capital Punishment
Prior to Graham, the United States Supreme Court only applied
categorical Eighth Amendment proportionality review to capital
sentences—known as the “death is different” approach.70 In
Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court expressly cabined categorical
proportionality review to capital punishment, noting that the death
penalty gives rise to “protections that the Constitution nowhere else
provides” and declining to extend proportionality review further.71

sex offender registry requirements and residency and employment restrictions, and suggests that these
requirements are punitive. 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). In Taylor, the appellant sought to
withdraw his guilty plea to child molestation based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 385. His
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based in part on his counsel’s failure to advise him that he
would be subject to Georgia’s sex offender registration requirements. Id. This claim turned on whether
the sex offender registry requirement was a direct consequence of a guilty plea, meaning it “lengthens or
alters the pronounced sentence” or only a collateral consequence, which would not give rise to a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 387 n.3. The Taylor court applied factors delineated by the
United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, in determining whether failure to advise of a
penalty that is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence” (in that case,
deportation) can give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1481–82 (2010); Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387–89. The Georgia Court of Appeals articulated:
[R]egistration as a sex offender is “intimately related to the criminal process” in that it is
an “automatic result” following certain criminal convictions; . . . [h]ence “[o]ur law has
enmeshed criminal convictions and [sex offender registration]” such that it is “most
difficult” to divorce the requirement of registration from the underlying criminal
conviction.
Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481). Further, the court noted that
“registration as a sex offender, like deportation, is a ‘drastic measure’ . . . with severe ramifications for a
convicted criminal,” including felony charges if a required registrant fails to comply. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d
at 388 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478). For the purpose of establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Taylor court found that sex offender registration is a “serious consequence” that must be
disclosed by counsel to a criminal defendant considering making a guilty plea. Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at
389. This treatment suggests that the Georgia registry and residency and employment restrictions are
more punitive, rather than merely regulatory, in nature.
The United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test in Smith v. Doe for determining
whether a sex offender registry statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause: 1) did the state legislature act
with punitive intent in creating the law, and if not 2) is the statute punitive in effect? 538 U.S. 84, 92
(2003). While “the Georgia legislature’s stated intent is nonpunitive, the [residency and employment]
statute’s effect is punitive,” especially considering the effects if the school bus stop provision were
enforced. West, supra note 2, at 257 (emphasis added) (applying the Smith test to the Georgia residency
restrictions and asserting that the statute is punitive in effect).
70. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561–64 (2005); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
994 (1991); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption
Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 86, 87 (2010).
71. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (denying proportionality review for a life-without-parole sentence for
a first-time drug offender, even though the sentence was notably severe).
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In his concurrence in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy noted that
proportionality had generally been applied to capital cases, but
asserted that the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment
also applies to noncapital sentences.72 Though it forbids “only
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime,”
these can include sentences short of death.73 In Graham, the approach
voiced by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin was adopted by the Court,
and a non-capital sentence was found unconstitutional under
proportionality review.74 Thus, Graham opened the door for
evaluating the proportionality and constitutionality of other noncapital punishments.75
2. Model of Proportionality Review Put Forth in Graham
In Graham, the Supreme Court considered a categorical challenge
to a term-of-years sentence, life without parole for a juvenile
convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery, based on
the proportionality principle of the Eighth Amendment.76 The Court
uses a two-part analysis to consider such categorical challenges: first,
do objective indicia suggest there is a national consensus against the
sentencing practice; then second, does the punishment violate the
Constitution based on the Court’s own interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment?77 When measuring “objective indicia of national
72. Id. at 997, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 997–98, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303
(1983)).
74. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010); Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Punishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one time may, in the light of reason and
experience, be found cruel and unusual at a later time; unless we are to abandon the moral commitment
embodied in the Eighth Amendment, proportionality review must never become effectively obsolete.”
(citations omitted)).
75. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036–37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021–23. The Court reviews two classifications of proportionality
challenges: 1) challenges to the length or severity of a sentence based on the facts of a particular case,
and 2) challenges based on categorical restrictions on the death penalty. Id. at 2021. The categorical
challenges have included two subsets, one turning on the characteristics of the offense and the other
turning on the characteristics of the offender. Id. at 2022. Graham presented a categorical challenge to a
term-of-years sentence for a non-homicide offender, based on the offender’s characteristic of being a
juvenile, thus questioning a non-capital sentencing practice generally rather than only as applied to the
facts of this case. Id. at 2022–23.
77. Id. at 2022. See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
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consensus,” the Court considers legislative enactments permitting the
challenged sentence for juveniles and actual sentencing practices.78 If
the punishment is less common, the Court considers it to have less
support from the national consensus.79 However, the Court notes that
community consensus “is not itself determinative of whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual.”80
The Court’s independent judgment of whether the sentence is cruel
and unusual entails considering the culpability of the offenders and
the severity of the challenged punishment.81 The culpability of the
offenders should be assessed “in light of their crimes and
characteristics.”82 In evaluating the punishment, the Court must also
evaluate whether it serves legitimate penological goals.83
Regarding the culpability of juvenile offenders, the Graham Court
reiterated the holding in Roper v. Simmons that juveniles have
diminished culpability as compared to adult offenders, and therefore
“are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”84 A juvenile
offender who commits a crime that, by its own nature, is less
deserving of the most severe punishments “has a twice diminished
moral culpability.”85 In evaluating the severity of the challenged
punishment, the Court not only observed the harshness of the
78. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
79. Id. at 2023–26. The Court weighed evidence that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia,
and federal law permit life sentences without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders under some
circumstances against the rarity with which this sentence is actually applied. Id. at 2023–25. The Court
also noted that many states do not specifically prohibit the sentence, but do not actually apply it. Id. at
2025. “The sentencing practice now under consideration is exceedingly rare. And ‘it is fair to say that a
national consensus has developed against it.’” Id. at 2026 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316
(2002)).
80. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
81. Id. at 2026.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. The Court considers whether the challenged sentence is justified by penological goals “that
have been recognized as legitimate”: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at
2028.
84. Id. at 2026 (affirming the holding in Roper that characteristics of juvenile offenders make them
less culpable for their actions than are adult offenders, including: a lack of maturity and responsibility,
greater susceptibility to negative influences, and a more transitory character (citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005))); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (articulating these “[t]hree
general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults” that demonstrate the reduced culpability of
juvenile offenders).
85. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. See Smith & Cohen, supra note 70, at 91–92 (discussing the
significance of this “constitutional mathematics” in creating a new constitutional principle).
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sentence generally, but specifically considered its severity as applied
to a juvenile.86 The Court noted that juveniles and adults both
sentenced to life without parole only nominally receive the same
punishment because the effect of the sentence for a juvenile will be
much more severe.87 Finally, the Court evaluated whether the
challenged sentencing practice was supported by legitimate
penological goals, and for each penological goal, the characteristics
and immaturity of juvenile offenders undermined the justification for
the sentence.88 Because of the diminished culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the severity of the challenged sentence, and the
lack of justification by penological goals, the Court drew a bright
line, categorically forbidding life-without-parole sentences for these
offenders.89
B. Scientific Research On Maturation And Its Implications For
Culpability Of Juvenile Offenders
Evaluating whether a punishment is cruel and unusual requires
courts to apply societal morals and standards of decency, which
change over time.90 Rather than being fixed, notions of cruelty
involve moral judgments and, as noted by the United States Supreme
Court, “must change as the basic mores of society change.”91 A
punishment considered constitutionally permissible in the past may
not be acceptable today, because our understandings of decency,
culpability, or social values change over time.92 As science uncovers
new information about adolescent development, our understanding of
86. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2028–30 (finding that goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation do
not justify a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offender, based largely on the
characteristics and immaturity of juveniles).
89. Id. at 2030 (asserting that the Constitution “does not foreclose the possibility that [juvenile nonhomicide offenders] will remain behind bars for life” but that they must be given “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”).
90. Id. at 2021 (“To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond
historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))).
91. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972).
92. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the culpability of juvenile offenders evolves, and consequently our
evaluation of punishments for these offenders evolves as well.
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment, thus declaring a punishment previously considered
constitutional to be cruel and unusual.93 The Roper Court found that
there are three differences between juveniles and adults that diminish
juveniles’ culpability.94 First, youths lack maturity and a sense of
responsibility, so when they act irresponsibly, their conduct is less
morally reprehensible than that of an adult.95 Second, juveniles have
greater susceptibility to negative influences and peer pressure, and at
the same time lack control over their environment and ability to
escape those influences.96 Third, juveniles have a more transitory
character and personality, undermining any conclusion that a juvenile
who commits even a heinous crime has an “irretrievably depraved
character.”97 The conclusions about juvenile culpability made in
Roper were adopted by the Court in Graham as well.98 Since the
Roper Court based its holding about the constitutionality of the
punishment on its findings regarding adolescent development, which
were then adopted in Graham, further scientific discoveries about

93. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
94. Id. at 569.
95. Id. (noting that juveniles are denied the same rights as adults because of their immaturity and
irresponsibility); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“The reasons why juveniles are
not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”).
96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that while juveniles are more vulnerable to negative influences,
they also have less control over their own environments and “‘lack the freedom that adults have to
extricate themselves from a crimogenic setting’” (quoting Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003))).
97. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. See also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 821 (“It is fair to assume
that most adults who engage in criminal conduct act upon subjectively defined preferences and values,
and that their choices can fairly be charged to deficient moral character. This cannot fairly be said of . . .
juvenile actors, whose choices, while unfortunate, are shaped by development factors that are
constitutive of adolescence.”).
98. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider
the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. . . . [D]evelopments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2012

17

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 7

546

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

maturation could either support the Court’s view of juvenile
culpability or undermine it.99
The Roper Court relied upon scientific and psychological research
presented in amicus curiae briefs in making its conclusions about the
differences between juveniles and adults.100 Critics have challenged
the sufficiency of the scientific and psychological support for the
Court’s conclusions regarding juveniles’ reduced culpability.101
However, psychological and neurological research continues to
support the Roper Court’s findings that the developmental
differences between juveniles and adults are significant and impact
culpability.102
Different legal issues implicate different types of maturity.103
While studies indicate that juveniles develop cognitive skills early
and may perform cognitive tasks comparable to adults by age sixteen,
they are not equal to adults with respect to psychosocial skills,
including impulse control and resistance to peer pressure.104 This
99. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15, 331 (reporting the authors’ conclusion from
studies of brain development, that “[b]ased on neurobiological data alone, it is clear that children and
adolescents are different both structurally and functionally from adults”); Lawrence Steinberg et al., Are
Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the
Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at
812–20.
100. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380–81, 380 n.8 (2006) (noting the Court’s reliance on a “substantial number
of amici briefs,” the majority of which (sixteen out of eighteen) were submitted on behalf of the juvenile
respondent, including briefs by the American Psychological Association, American Bar Association,
and President Jimmy Carter).
101. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 617–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging as contradictory claims
by the American Psychological Association in its amicus brief for petitioner that minors “lack the ability
to take moral responsibility for their decisions” when the Association also submitted an amicus brief in
another, unrelated case urging that minors were mature enough to make abortion decisions without
parental involvement); Denno, supra note 100, at 381 (asserting that the Court failed to cite adequately
and relied too heavily on a few resources and some outdated resources).
102. Psychological and brain research indicates that juveniles differ from adults in their cognitive and
psycho-social development, and that risky, even illegal, behavior is a common element of identity
development for juveniles. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15; Steinberg et al., supra
note 99; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 812–20.
103. Steinberg et al., supra note 99, at 585–86, 593.
104. Id. at 586 (“[O]ur findings, as well as those of other researchers, suggest that whereas
adolescents and adults perform comparably on cognitive tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities
. . . that permit logical reasoning about moral, social, and interpersonal matters—adolescents and adults
are not of equal maturity with respect to the psychosocial capacities listed by Justice Kennedy in his
opinion in Roper—capacities such as impulse control and resistance to peer influence.”).
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psychosocial immaturity means that in circumstances that usually
accompany criminal activities, juveniles find themselves facing “the
very conditions that are likely to undermine adolescents’ decisionmaking competence.”105 Thus, while juveniles may be capable of
making mature decisions under some circumstances, their
psychosocial immaturity justifies considerations that they are less
culpable than adults when they engage in criminal activities.106
Reflecting this understanding of the effects of maturation on
juveniles, the Court has found immaturity to reduce culpability when
evaluating the constitutionality of capital punishment and a life
sentence without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.107 The
same considerations can also be applied in evaluating other
sentences, such as those prescribed under Georgia sex offender
statutes.
C. Applying Graham To Georgia’s Statutes
Applying the Eighth Amendment analysis of Graham to the
Georgia sex offender registration and residence and employment
restriction statutes as applied to juvenile offenders involves three
inquiries. First, is there a national consensus opposing the application
of these statutes to juvenile offenders?108 Second, considering the
nature of the crime and characteristics of the juvenile offenders, is the
severity of the punishment justified?109 Third, does the punishment
serve legitimate penological goals?110
1. Indicia of National Consensus
In Graham, the indicia considered to evaluate whether the national
consensus supported the challenged sentence were legislative
105. Id. 592.
106. Id. 592–93.
107. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (finding a life sentence without parole
unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (finding
the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
108. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
109. Id. at 2022, 2026.
110. Id.
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enactments enabling the sentencing practice and actual use of the
sentence.111 While the requirements for registration of juvenile
offenders vary, all states require at least some juvenile offenders to
register.112 However, only thirteen states impose residency and
employment restrictions on registered sex offenders, while five states
impose only employment restrictions.113 These requirements are
automatically imposed upon offenders convicted under these
statutes.114
The existence of registration requirements for juvenile sex
offenders in every state indicates that the national consensus favors
sex offender registration; however, the fact that only a quarter of the
states require juvenile offenders to comply with residency and
employment restrictions suggests a lack of consensus supporting such
restrictions.115 Even in the states that have residency restrictions, the
parameters vary.116 For example, Mississippi forbids any registered
sex offender from living within fifteen hundred feet of schools or
childcare centers,117 Montana only imposes residency restrictions for
violent offenders whose victims were minors,118 and New York
imposes no residency restrictions but forbids sex offenders from
owning or operating ice cream trucks.119 Georgia’s statutes are far
111. Id. at 2023.
112. SMITH, supra note 31 (reporting sex offender registration requirements for all states and the
District of Columbia). Examples of different treatment of juvenile sex offenders include Colorado,
where juveniles convicted as adults and adjudicated as delinquent must register (COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-22-103(4) (2008)); Georgia, where only juveniles charged as adults must register (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12 (2010)); and Arkansas, where juveniles adjudicated as delinquent are assessed and a court
hearing is held to determine whether they are obligated to register as sex offenders (ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-27-356 (2008)). Id.
113. SMITH, supra note 31 (reporting residency and employment restrictions based on proximity to
schools or other child-focused centers in thirteen states (Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Tennessee) and
employment restrictions in five states (California, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, and New York)).
114. SMITH, supra note 31.
115. Id.; cf. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–25 (finding the national consensus did not favor the
challenged sentencing practice when it was permitted in thirty-eight jurisdictions and under federal law,
but only rarely applied, and noting that the scarcity of jurisdictions prohibiting the practice does not
undermine the consensus against it).
116. SMITH, supra note 31.
117. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25 (2008).
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225 (2008).
119. N.Y. CORRECT. § 168-v (McKinney 2008).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/7

20

Shepard: Does The Punishment Fit The Crime?: Applying Eighth Amendment Pro

2012]

GEORGIA JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS

549

more restrictive than any other state’s in forbidding all registered
offenders from living within one thousand feet of schools, childcare
centers, churches, and areas where children congregate, a broad term
encompassing pools, skating rinks, playgrounds, and school bus
stops.120 Georgia is thus an outlier in national practices restricting sex
offenders.
2. Balancing the Juvenile’s Criminal Conduct and the Severity of
the Punishment
Comparing the criminal conduct to the severity of the punishment
involves considering the nature of the crime and the characteristics of
the offender.121 In this Note, the relevant characteristic of the
offenders is their juvenile status, which warrants their treatment as
less culpable than adults who commit the same acts.122 The nature of
the crimes triggering sex offender registration requirements varies
greatly; however, offenders are all subject to the same residency and
employment restrictions.123 The stated purpose of the restrictions is to
protect the public, particularly from recidivist or violent sex
offenders and those who prey on children.124 However, the
uniformity of application of the statutes means they are also applied
to offenders whose behavior is not predatory or even sexual in
nature.125 The restrictions also have a uniquely harsh effect on
juveniles because the laws prohibit them from living or spending
time near schools and establishments that exist for juveniles, thus
prohibiting them from carrying out their usual activities once
released from any prison or probation sentence.126 While there will
be circumstances in which this punishment is not excessively severe

120. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010); SMITH, supra note 31; West, supra note 2, at 239–41, 254–
55.
121. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518.
124. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf.
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
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in comparison to the criminal offense, because it is applied uniformly
there will also be circumstances where it will be excessively punitive.
3. Penological Goals
The penological goals considered by the Graham Court include
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.127 In
Graham, the Court held that the juvenile status of the offender
undermined each of these goals, and so the goals did not justify the
punishment.128 Because of the diminished culpability of a juvenile
offender, the justification of retribution is less compelling.129
Juveniles’ lack of maturity makes them less susceptible to
deterrence.130 While the possibility of punishment for their conduct
could be known, it may provide limited deterrence to juveniles
because their immaturity makes them less likely to make decisions
based on a possible punishment.131 The Graham Court acknowledged
the importance of the goal of incapacitation, but on the facts of the
case found the level of incapacitation to be disproportionate, in part
because of Graham’s youth.132 Finally, the Graham Court noted that
juveniles “are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation,” but the
challenged sentence did not provide rehabilitation opportunities.133
Those same penological goals also do not provide strong
justification for imposing sex offender registration requirements and
residency and employment requirements uniformly to juvenile
127. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010).
128. Id. (“[N]one of the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate . . . provides
an adequate justification.”).
129. Id. at 2028 (“[R]etribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”).
130. Id. (“‘[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that
juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571
(2005))).
131. Id. at 2028–29 (noting that due to immaturity, juvenile offenders are “less likely to take a
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions”).
132. Id. at 2029 (noting that because his crime, attempting to rob a restaurant and striking the
manager, may reflect transient immaturity, “Graham deserved to be separated from society for some
time . . . but it does not follow that he would be a risk to society for the rest of his life.”).
133. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30 (noting that a sentence of life in prison without parole denies an
opportunity to rehabilitate and that by “denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society”).
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offenders. The penological justification of retribution is reduced for a
juvenile offender, and particularly weakened when the offense
triggering the punishment is non-violent or consensual, as are some
offenses giving rise to sex offender status.134 For behaviors like
“sexting,” juveniles may not even be aware that such behavior could
lead to being convicted as a sex offender, so the sentence will be less
effective as a deterrent.135
Unlike a prison term, residency and employment restrictions do
not completely accomplish a goal of incapacitation. The sex
offenders are out of prison and capable of interacting with potential
victims, even though the restrictions significantly limit their freedom
and opportunities.136 Thus, the Georgia restrictions set notable
boundaries on offenders without actually incapacitating them from
committing subsequent offenses.137 Finally, the Georgia statutes do
not deny an offender any opportunity for rehabilitation, but they
prevent her from fully incorporating back into society.138 This is
particularly true for a juvenile offender whose usual environment
may be forbidden by the restrictions.
In short, the juvenile status of sex offenders undermines the
penological goals considered in Graham when offered to justify
imposing residency and employment restrictions on all juvenile sex
offenders. Considering this along with the underwhelming national
support for imposing residency and employment restrictions of the
type Georgia imposes and the severity of the punishment for some
crimes that give rise to sex offender status, the Georgia statutes
appear to violate the Eighth Amendment when applied uniformly to
juvenile offenders.
134. Id. at 2028 (noting that the case for retribution is undermined by the offender’s juvenile status,
and further undermined by the nature of his crime, a non-homicide offense); see supra Part I.A.
135. Scott, supra note 10 (reporting the confusion of schools, parents, and juveniles about possible
legal consequences for sex-related misuse of new technologies like cell phones and computers).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
137. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010). But see Geraghty, supra note 1, at 518; West, supra note 2, at
239–41, 254–55 (asserting that Georgia’s residency and employment restrictions are so severe they
effectively banish sex offenders from the state).
138. Compare the residency and employment restrictions (GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010)) with the
life-without-parole sentence of Graham that “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal [b]y denying
the defendant the right to reenter the community.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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III. REMEDYING PROPORTIONALITY FOR JUVENILES UNDER
GEORGIA’S SEX OFFENDER STATUTES
To remedy proportionality concerns about Georgia’s sex offender
statutes as applied to offenders who are minors, the laws should be
changed to provide different treatment for juvenile offenders, rather
than applying to them the same as adult offenders.
A. Juvenile Sex Offenders Should Be Treated Differently Than Adults
Under Georgia Law
Changes in the treatment of juvenile offenders throughout legal
history reflect changes in our understandings of those offenders. As
social attitudes about juvenile offenders changed, from seeing them
as wayward children needing rehabilitation at the inception of
juvenile justice systems during the Progressive era to seeing them as
hardened deviants threatening society since the 1980s, their legal
treatment also changed.139 While early juvenile justice systems
separated minors from adults and focused on rehabilitation, later
trends were to treat juvenile offenders as adults and subject them to
the harshest punishments.140
Current scientific and psychological research suggests that
immaturity of juvenile offenders mitigates culpability141 and supports
different treatment under the law for children and adolescents.142
139. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 804–09 (reporting the history of the legal treatment of
juvenile offenders and the conceptualizations of juveniles and their culpability that undergirded different
approaches to juvenile offenders).
140. Id. at 804–07 (tracking the shift from the Progressive reforms that created the juvenile justice
system for rehabilitating offenders seen as “misguided children rather than culpable wrongdoers” to the
contemporary reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that led to younger offenders being punished as adults for
more crimes, fueled by “an exaggerated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of
offenders, and collective hostility toward the [juvenile] offenders”).
141. Id. at 801 (“First, the scientific evidence indicates that teens are simply less competent decision
makers than adults, largely because typical features of adolescent psycho-social development contribute
to immature judgment. . . . Second . . . [y]outhful involvement in crime is often a part of [the process of
developing identity and character], and, as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a transitory
stage, rather than those of an individual with a settled identity.”).
142. Id. at 829–31 (noting that “a culpability line should be drawn between children and adolescents,”
with pre-adolescent children being excused from responsibility for criminal behavior due to their
extreme immaturity, but only mitigating the culpability of adolescents based on the maturity differences
distinguishing them from adult offenders).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/7

24

Shepard: Does The Punishment Fit The Crime?: Applying Eighth Amendment Pro

2012]

GEORGIA JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS

553

However, in Georgia once a juvenile is found guilty of a sexual
offense, rather than being adjudicated delinquent, the juvenile is
treated identically as an adult offender under the law.143 Because they
are less culpable than adult offenders, juvenile offenders should be
treated differently under the law.144
For some circumstances, the current sentencing may be
proportional and appropriate even for juvenile offenders,145 but for
other conduct, the underlying behavior is not the sort contemplated
by the stated purpose of the Georgia sex offender statutes.146 Peer-onpeer behavior, nonviolent conduct, and consensual conduct by
juveniles can trigger the requirement to register as a sex offender.147
Were these sorts of conduct perpetrated by an adult offender upon a
minor victim, the sentence would conform to the intent of the
legislature to target predators. However, in these circumstances, the
juvenile status of the offender defeats the state’s concern with adults
taking advantage of minors.
Further, the effects of the residency and employment restrictions
are unique and harsh for juvenile offenders, because the offenders are
forbidden from places intended for youth in the community: schools,
churches, and areas where their peers congregate.148 The stigma of
being publicly labeled a sex offender can be especially harmful to
143. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823–24 (1988).
145. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (“The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on
the analysis.” (emphasis added)); cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73 (holding that individualized
consideration did not warrant imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile offender and instead
categorically banning the punishment for juveniles). The challenged punishment in Roper, the death
penalty, is far more severe than the sex offender registry and residency and employment restrictions
discussed in this Note, and therefore triggers stronger consideration of the reduced culpability of
juvenile offenders. Id. The Roper Court acknowledged that many juvenile offenders have committed
brutal crimes and that “a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient psychological
maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to merit a sentence of death,” although
it does not concede that point. Id. at 572.
146. H.R. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2006), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/hb1059.pdf (declaring the intent of the Georgia
legislature in implementing the residency and employment restrictions to address the “extreme threat to
the public safety” posed by “recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and
sexual offenders who prey on children”).
147. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(10) (2010).
148. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
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adolescents, whose developmental stage makes them highly
susceptible to peer influence and judgment.149 Juvenile sex offenders
face a minimum of ten years in prison for living or loitering near
their own schools or from finding employment at businesses catering
to youth and likely to hire teenagers.150 Because juveniles are likely
to live with their families, rather than independently, the residency
restrictions would affect not only the juvenile sex offender, but their
entire family because the family would have to comply with the
residency restrictions or else separate.151
B. Changing Georgia’s Sex Offender Laws
The violation of the proportionality principle when these laws are
applied to juveniles,152 the differential effects of Georgia’s sex
offender registration statutes on juveniles compared to adults,153 and
the failure of these statutes in fulfilling legislative intent,154 all lead to
the conclusion that juvenile offenders should be treated differently
under the law. To alter the existing framework of Georgia’s sex
offender statutes, several changes should be made to the statutes,
which could be incorporated comprehensively or individually. First,
courts should conduct individual assessments of juvenile sex
offenders to determine whether they should be required to comply
with registration requirements, and also whether they should be
required to comply with residency and employment restrictions.
Second, the default registration term for juvenile offenders should be
a term of years, rather than the rest of their lives.

149. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 813–14; Brown, supra note 15, at 369–70 (providing an
example of a Delaware teenager required to register as a sex offender, due to conduct perpetrated when
he was eleven years old, who became suicidal and required extensive psychiatric treatment after being
bullied and teased by classmates because of his registration status).
150. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010).
151. Id.; Plaintiffs’ Statement, supra note 36, at 13–17, 19–20 (noting that in one Georgia county that
has officially designated school bus stops, every one of the four registered juvenile sex offenders in the
county would have to move to comply with residency restrictions).
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 146.
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1. Individual Assessment for Juvenile Offenders
For juvenile offenders, even when tried as adults, courts should
conduct individual assessment of the culpability of the offender and
the risks they pose in relation to the purposes of the residency
statutes.155 Based on the circumstances of the case, the trial court
should determine whether the offender poses the threats to children
and society contemplated by the registration requirement, considering
the nature of the crime and the age and characteristics of the juvenile
offender. Then, the trial court can apply the registration requirement
as warranted rather than automatically upon conviction.156 Courts
should also have the discretion to apply the residency and
employment restrictions to juvenile sex offenders, or waive those
restrictions for some juveniles.157 This would allow courts to evaluate
the culpability of the offender before labeling a juvenile offender a
“sex offender” and to consider the unique effects of the residency and
employment restrictions on minors and their families before
implementing them.

155. See supra note 146. The intent of the legislature in passing the residency and employment
restrictions was to protect the public from “recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use
physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children.” Id.
156. Some other states give courts discretion in ordering offenders to register. SMITH, supra note 31.
For example, under Arkansas statute, if a juvenile offender is adjudicated delinquent for certain sex
crimes, the court must conduct a “sex offender screening and risk assessment” to determine whether it
will require the offender to register as a sex offender; there is not an automatic requirement that juvenile
sex offenders register. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356 (2008). Factors the court considers in evaluating
whether the offender must register include: seriousness of the offense, level of planning and preparation,
any previous sex offense history, availability of rehabilitative programs, and assessments of the
juvenile’s mental, social, physical, and educational history. Id.
157. Some other states give courts discretion to determine when offenders must comply with
residency and employment restrictions, or limit which offenders must comply with the restrictions.
SMITH, supra note 31. For example, under Louisiana statute residency restrictions are only applied to
“sexually violent predators,” not every person required to register as a sex offender. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:91.1 (2008). In Montana, only violent offenders whose victims were children are subject to
residency restrictions, and the judge has discretion to impose “reasonable” employment restrictions.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-255 (2008).
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2. Shorter Default Registration Requirements for Juvenile Sex
Offenders
Rather than making lifetime registration the default sentence for all
offenders, the default registration requirement should be shorter for
juvenile offenders. By statute, courts could be allowed to extend the
requirements further if merited by the circumstances of a case, but
the default registration requirement should be a set term of years158 or
until a threshold age, such as twenty-one or twenty-five, has been
reached.159 Setting a default registration requirement shorter than the
offender’s lifetime would acknowledge the transitory nature of
juveniles’ characters, rather than painting them as sex offenders for
life based on juvenile conduct.
CONCLUSION
Georgia’s sex offender registration and residency and employment
restriction statutes have faced, and continue to face, legal
challenges160 and criticism that they are excessively harsh.161 These
statutes apply to juvenile offenders charged as adults and to adult
offenders alike, even though both United States Supreme Court
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence162 and current scientific research163
158. Some other states require registration of sex offenders only for a term of years, depending on
various factors. SMITH, supra note 31. For example, Alabama has a lifetime default registration
requirement for adult sex offenders, but juvenile sex offenders are only required to register for ten years.
ALA. CODE § 15-20-33 (2008). Louisiana and Minnesota provide examples of the many states that have
tiered registration requirements, with lifetime requirements for violent or recidivist sex offenders, and
terms of years for other offenders. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:544 (2008) (establishing a three-tiered
system with registration requirements of fifteen years, twenty-five years, and lifetime of the offender);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (2008) (establishing a two-tiered system with registration requirements of
ten years or lifetime of the offender).
159. For example, in Arizona, juvenile sex offenders’ registration requirements end at age twentyfive. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (2008). In Arkansas, juvenile offenders can petition to be
removed from the sex offender registry at age twenty-one, but if they are denied, the registration
requirement terminates ten years after the offense. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-356 (2008).
160. See, e.g., Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010); Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d
740 (Ga. 2007); Grovenstein v. State, 637 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Whitaker v. Perdue, No.
4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. filed July 20, 2006).
161. See, e.g., West, supra note 2; Geraghty, supra note 1.
162. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
163. See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 15; Steinberg et al., supra note 99; Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 15, at 812–20.
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embrace the notion that juvenile offenders are less culpable than
adult offenders committing the same acts. The uniform application of
sex offender registration and residency and employment restrictions
to minor offenders is not justified by the intent of the legislature164
and raises the question of whether they violate the proportionality
principle of the Eighth Amendment.165 While some circumstances
may warrant applying the statutes to a juvenile as they are applied to
adult offenders, this should not be default or automatic. Rather, the
statutes should be changed so that they continue to protect citizens
from harm while also accommodating the unique position of juvenile
offenders.
Rather than being automatically labeled “sex offenders” upon
conviction for certain crimes, juvenile offenders should be
individually evaluated to determine whether their conduct is the
violent, predatory conduct the statutes seek to prevent.166 Even when
requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders, courts should use
discretion in applying the residency and employment restrictions to
juvenile offenders. The default lifetime requirement for sex offender
registration also should be ameliorated for juveniles.167 Instead of
labeling minors as sex offenders for life, any registration requirement
should be for a shortened term of years or until attainment of a
certain age.
Given what society continues to learn about juvenile development,
which the United States Supreme Court acknowledges reduces the
culpability of youthful offenders,168 there is little justification for
continuing to treat juvenile sex offenders uniformly the same as
adults. Individual assessment of juvenile offenders and shorter
default terms under the registration statutes could help address Eighth
Amendment proportionality concerns raised by the current Georgia
statutes.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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